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noncitizens, to the detriment of affected noncitizens.1 At its height during fiscal year
2019, the average daily number of individuals in the custody of United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) was 50,165.2 As of early January
2021, amid the still worsening coronavirus pandemic, more than 16,000 individuals
remained in ICE custody.3 When President Biden took office on January 20, 2021,
he immediately revised ICE’s enforcement priorities and attempted a 100 day pause
on removals.4 He is considering ending the detention of noncitizens in private
prisons,5 and has been urged to end the detention of noncitizens altogether.6
Despite these significant steps forward, more than 14,000 individuals remain in ICE
custody as of January 29, 2021.7
These numbers include individuals with legal status and individuals applying
for asylum because they have fled persecution in their home countries. 8 Many of
these individuals go on to win their immigration cases and remain lawfully in the
United States.9 In the meantime, however, they have been separated from their
families and may have lost jobs, homes, relationships, and years of their lives as a
result of their detention.10 They have also been placed at increased risk of

1. See, e.g., Sarah Pierce & Jessica Bolter, Dismantling and Reconstructing the U.S. Immigration
System: A Catalog of Changes under the Trump Presidency, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (July 2020),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPI_US-Immigration-TrumpPresidency-Final.pdf; Sarah Stillman, The Race to Dismantle Trump’s Immigration Policies, NEW YORKER
(Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/02/08/the-race-to-dismantle-trumpsimmigration-policies (describing project logging more than one–thousand fifty eight changes to
immigration law and policy between 2017 and the end of the Trump administration).
2. ICE Guidance on COVID–19, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus
(last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
3. Id.
4. Revision of Civil Enforcement Policies and Priorities, Exec. Order No. 13,993, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051
(Jan. 25, 2021). But see Texas v. United States, No. 6:21–cv–00003, 2021 WL 247877, at *1 (S.D. Tx. Jan.
26, 2021) (issuing a temporary restraining order against the 100 day pause on removals).
5. See Noah Lanard, Biden Pledged to Close For–Profit ICE Detention Centers. Will He Follow
Through?, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2021/01/bidenpledged-to-close-for-profit-ice-detention-centers-will-he-follow-through/;
cf.
Reforming
Our
Incarceration System To Eliminate the Use of Privately Operated Criminal Detention Facilities, Exec.
Order No. 14,006, 86 Fed. Reg. 7483 (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/presidential-actions/2021/01/26/executive-order-reforming-our-incarceration-system-toeliminate-the-use-of-privately-operated-criminal-detention-facilities/ (ending the use of private prisons
for criminal, but not civil, immigration detention).
6. Lanard, supra note 5.
7. U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836–39 (2018).
9. See id. at 858 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10–25,
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15–1204).
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contracting and suffering serious illness as a result of COVID-19.11 The federal courts
have played an important role in recognizing and protecting the constitutional
rights of noncitizens, including ICE detainees, but their ability to act has been at
least somewhat constrained by the plenary power doctrine and the theory of
immigration exceptionalism.
The Supreme Court in its October 2016 term had the chance to address the
constitutionality of this detention and due process protections for pre-final order
immigration detainees.12 Observers hoped that the Court would make use of the
opportunity of the juxtaposition of Jennings and two other immigration cases
before the Court at the same time to confront the role of the plenary power
doctrine and constitutional law in immigration cases.13 The plenary power doctrine
is the concept that Congress has the absolute power, immune from judicial review,
to decide which noncitizens to admit into and deport from the United States. 14
Courts have traditionally applied the plenary power doctrine to find “the power of
the federal government over immigration to be nearly unlimited and the
constitutional rights of immigrants to be extremely limited-and, in many cases,
virtually nonexistent.”15 The plenary power doctrine has deep roots in the history

11. See, e.g., Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709, 721–22 (C.D. Cal.
2020).
12. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830.
13. See, e.g., Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism: Administrative
Law in the Supreme Court’s Immigration Jurisprudence, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 215 (2018); Alina Das,
Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485, 497 (2018). In addition to
Jennings, the Court also heard Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 136 Sup. Ct. 2545 (2016), an equal
protection challenge to a law providing different residency requirements for unmarried men and women
to pass United States citizenship to their children, and Sessions v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016),
considering whether 18 U.S.C. §16(b), the definition of crime of violence, is unconstitutionally vague as
incorporated into the aggravated felony ground of removability at INA §101(a)(43)(F). The constitutional
issues (rather than constitutional avoidance or deciding the case on some other basis) also featured
prominently during oral arguments in Morales-Santana and Dimaya. See, e.g., Amy Howe, Argument
Analysis: Searching for a Remedy for Constitutional Violation on Citizenship, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2016,
2:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com; Kevin Johnson, Argument Analysis: Is the Statutory Phrase
“Crime of Violence” in the Immigration Laws Void for Vagueness?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 18, 2017, 2:32 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com.
14. See Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of
212(c) and 212(h) Waivers, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 111, 115–18 (2017); Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the
Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 58–59
(2015). See also Fong Yue Ting. v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706–15 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 609 (1889).
15. Brian Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
363, 365 (2007); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545, 547 (1990).
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of immigration jurisprudence and a strong hold on immigration law. While scholars
have predicted the demise of the plenary power doctrine for decades,16 and courts
have in fact applied ordinary principles of law to review immigration laws, the
plenary power doctrine has retained at least some hold with courts reviewing
substantive provisions of immigration law.17 The opportunity for the Court to bring
some resolution to this troubled area of the law in the 2016 term was, therefore,
quite significant.
Ultimately, however, these hopes for a clear statement by the Supreme Court
on the viability of the plenary power doctrine and the constitutionality of extended
pre-final removal order detention did not come to pass. When the Court eventually
issued its decision in Jennings in February 2018, it reversed the decision of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) holding
that the Immigration and Nationality Act must be interpreted to provide noncitizens
in pending removal proceedings with regular bond hearings to avoid constitutional
violations.18 The majority for the Supreme Court held that the Ninth’s application
of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance was inappropriate, declined to decide
the case on constitutional grounds, and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for
it to consider the constitutional issues anew.19 As a result, approximately 20,000
individuals each year must remain detained during the pendency of their removal
proceedings, many for a year or more, with no right to a bond hearing.20 The result
in Jennings v. Rodriguez is a tremendous loss for immigrants and immigrant rights
advocates. In addition to its troubling impact on immigration detainees, at first
blush the Court’s decision seems disappointing doctrinally as well. A more intensive
examination of the Court’s decision, however, reveals that there may be a kernel of
opportunity in the Court’s decision.
I have previously argued that the caselaw in several different contexts
demonstrates a slow and uneven erosion of the theory of immigration

16. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Keynote to Immigration in the Trump Era Symposium: Judicial Review
and the Immigration Laws, 48 SW. L. REV. 463 (2019); Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?
A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 287 (2000); Johnson, supra note 14 , at 59–60; Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is
Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 27–29 (2015) (“A sober observer
would point out that immigration law scholars have been predicting the imminent demise of the plenary
power doctrine for at least three decades.”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power:
Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 936–37 (1995); Peter J. Spiro,
Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339–40 (2002); Motomura, supra note 15,
at 547.
17. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
18. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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exceptionalism.21 Immigration exceptionalism, explained briefly, is the idea that
immigration law is special and should not be subject to the same constraints
existing in other areas of the law.22 Despite often applying administrative and
constitutional law principles, the courts fail to fully engage on the administrative
and constitutional questions in these cases, resulting in many unanswered
questions and inconsistencies in applying administrative and constitutional law
principles.23 I argued that these gaps are vestiges of immigration exceptionalism –
a function of the courts’ lingering hesitation in applying administrative and
constitutional principles to immigration questions, as well as a practical
consequence of the fact that courts and litigants historically have been slow to
consider the impact of administrative law in immigration cases.24
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings may not initially appear to fit
this pattern of an erosion of the theory of immigration exceptionalism and the
plenary power doctrine, I will argue in this article that in fact it does. First, the
majority’s decision at least implicitly acknowledges that noncitizens have
constitutional rights. Second, and perhaps more significant, the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance has been used heavily (some say overused) in the
immigration context to avoid direct confrontation of constitutional issues.25 This
reliance on constitutional avoidance rather than deciding cases squarely on the
constitutional issues is a vestige of the plenary power doctrine, just like the gaps in
analysis discussed previously. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings should and
has in fact pushed some courts to address constitutional rights and issues explicitly
rather than hiding behind the veil of constitutional avoidance, thereby contributing
to the continued erosion of the doctrine of immigration exceptionalism.26 While
notable, this trend has not, however, been universal. There are significant
exceptions, to the point that it is sometimes difficult to tell whether we are moving
in the direction of erosion, or instead, of reinforcement of the theory of
immigration exceptionalism.27 As we (hopefully) begin to transition away from an
era of increased assertion of allegedly unlimited executive power over immigration
law and policy to the detriment of the affected noncitizens, these successes and
failures are particularly important to recognize and analyze.

21. Rodriguez, supra note 14 (in the context of the availability of waivers under INA § 212(h) and
the former INA § (212(c)); Rodriguez, supra note 13 (in the context of the Supreme Court’s recent
immigration jurisprudence, from the October 2010 through the October 2015 terms).
22. Rodriguez, supra note 14; Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) (defining immigration exceptionalism
as “the view that immigration and alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on government
decision-making”).
23. Rodriguez, supra note 14; Rodriguez, supra note 13.
24. Rodriguez, supra note 14; Rodriguez, supra note 13.
25. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 15, at 549–50; Das, supra note 13, at 490–93.
26. See infra Section III.C.
27. See infra Section III.A, III.B.
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In Section I of this paper, I discuss the historical use of constitutional
avoidance in immigration cases by the Supreme Court.28 Section II focuses on
Jennings v. Rodriguez itself. Finally, in section III, I analyze the aftermath and
implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings for the future of
constitutional avoidance in immigration cases, the plenary power doctrine, and a
theory of immigration exceptionalism more broadly.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION CASES
A. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Constitutional avoidance is a canon of statutory construction with deep roots
in American jurisprudence. Its use has been traced back to the early 1800’s,
predating even the Supreme Court’s decision on judicial review in Marbury v.
Madison.29 The canon has at least two different formulations.30 The first principle
of constitutional avoidance states simply that courts should avoid deciding
constitutional questions if it is possible to do so.31 This principle has been described
as the “last resort rule”32 or “procedural avoidance.”33
The second principle of constitutional avoidance is focused on statutory
interpretation, calling for statutes to be interpreted to avoid constitutional
problems. The older formulation of this principle, sometimes called “classical
avoidance,” calls for courts to choose the constitutional interpretation of a statute
where both a constitutional and an unconstitutional interpretation are fairly
possible.34 In its most common formulation today, application of the canon is
triggered if “an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, and . . . an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly

28. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289 (2001); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
29. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Compare Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 CONST. COMMENT. 1945, 1948 (1997) (tracing its use back to Mossman v. Higginson, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800)), with Lisa Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003,
1006 n.7, 1015–16 (1994) (tracing its use back to Ex Parte Randolph, 20 F.Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833)
(No. 11,558)).
30. Compare Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1574–75 (2000) (“two distinct principles of avoidance”), with
Vermeule, supra note 29 ("Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority catalogued no fewer than seven
doctrines, interpretive canons, and general principles of judicial decision making.”); Kloppenberg, supra
note 29, at 1005 (“seven components of the avoidance doctrine”).
31. See Young, supra note 30, at 1574–75; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.
288, 347 (1936).
32. Kloppenberg, supra note 29, at 1025–27; Young, supra note 30, at 1574–75.
33. Vermeule, supra note 29, at 1948–49; Young, supra note 30, at 1574–75.
34. See Young, supra note 30, at 1574–76; Vermeule, supra note 30, at 1948–49.

2021

IMMIGRATION DETENTION: EROSION OR
REINFORCEMENT OF A THEORY OF IMMIGRATION
EXCEPTIONALISM

725

possible.”35 Under these circumstances, the court should construe the statute to
avoid the constitutional problem.36 This version of the canon of constitutional
avoidance is sometimes known as “modern avoidance.”37 Scholars have sometimes
described it as requiring the courts to adopt a “second best” interpretation of the
statute in order to avoid a serious constitutional issue.38 To make precise the
distinction between classical and modern avoidance, classical avoidance applies
only when the court holds that a possible interpretation is actually unconstitutional,
while modern avoidance kicks in even in cases of “constitutional doubt.”39
Constitutional avoidance generally is sometimes described as a substantive or
normative canon, a “policy-based directive[] about how statutory ambiguity should
be resolved[,]” as opposed to a textual canon.40 It is widely considered to be a
prudential rule, that is a “nonconstitutional, self-imposed restraint[].”41 Debate
over the appropriate use of the canon is closely intertwined with big-picture
structural questions regarding our system of government: “the proper scope of
federal judicial review and the allocation of power among the three branches of the
federal government and the states.”42 Courts and commentators have invoked
multiple different and conflicting rationale in support of the application of this
canon.43 Some take the position that the canon is a way of ensuring that the courts
do not encroach on the other branches of government. 44 Specifically, some argue
that it is a way of fulfilling Congressional intent or, relatedly, that a court should
operate from a presumption that Congress did not intend to violate the

35. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.
830, 842–43 (2018). See also, e.g., NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:11 (7th ed. 2020); Young, supra note 30, at 1574–76; Vermeule, supra note 29, at
1948–49.
36. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300 (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345–
48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909); Jennings, 138 S.Ct. at 842–43.
37. Young, supra note 30, at 1574–76; Vermeule, supra note 29, at 1948–49.
38. Slocum, supra note 15, at 366, 369, 378–81 (“[T]he canon of constitutional avoidance . . .
requires courts to adopt a plausible-but not necessarily the most persuasive-interpretation of a statute
in order to avoid serious constitutional issues.”).
39. Young, supra note 30, at 1576–77; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1991).
40. Slocum, supra note 15, at 365–66; Young, supra note 30, at 1551 (describing constitutional
avoidance as a normative canon designed to push statutory interpretations in the direction of the
underlying constitutional values).
41. Kloppenberg, supra note 29, at 1016, 1005 n.7.
42. Kloppenberg, supra note 29, at 1005 n.7.
43. Kloppenberg, supra note 29, at 1015–16.
44. Kloppenberg, supra note 29, at 1015–16.
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Constitution.45 Others argue that the canon is instead concerned with protecting
substantive values, either the value of a constitutional system or the underlying
values engrained in the constitutional provisions at issue.46 At least one scholar has
suggested an additional reason for applying the canon: “[t]he usual reason for
applying the canon is to avoid defining what the Constitution means with virtually
irrevocable finality, and yet to provide a just result.”47
Some scholars and judges have criticized the use of the canon of constitutional
avoidance on a number of different grounds.48 Some say that it unnecessarily and
unwisely expands the reach of the Constitution.49 Others are concerned that it is
too easy to find constitutional doubt and the canon therefore allows judges to too
easily rewrite statutes according to their own preference. 50 Still others argue that it
violates separation of powers because it allows the judiciary to intrude on both the
legislative and the executive functions.51 A related criticism notes that
constitutional avoidance is frequently justified by the assertion that it is intended
to promote the intent of Congress but fails to promote Congress’ actual
preferences.52 A recent empirical study suggests that some of this criticism is
overstated.53 Despite these criticisms, the canon of constitutional avoidance
nevertheless remains firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence. 54

45. See, e.g., Slocum, supra note 15, at 375, 405 (“The Court . . . believes that applying it gives
effect to congressional intent because Congress would prefer the statutory interpretation that does not
raise constitutional doubts.”). See also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–
01, n.12 (2001).
46. Young, supra note 30, at 1551.
47. Motomura, supra note 15, at 573.
48. See, e.g., Slocum, supra note 15, at 405–06; Young, supra note 30, at 1551–52.
49. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – In the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 815–16 (1983) (“The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising
constitutional questions is therefore to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition
beyond even the most extravagant modern interpretation of the Constitution—to create a judge-made
constitutional ‘penumbra’ that has much the same prohibitory effect as the judge-made (or at least
judge-amplified) Constitution itself. And we do not need that.”).
50. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1405–06 (2002).
51. E.g., William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 834 (2001).
52. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 92 (1995).
53. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 830–31 (2017)
(suggesting that empirical evidence may not support some of the scholarly critiques of the substantive
canons, including the canon of constitutional avoidance).
54. See, e.g., Slocum, supra note 15, at 375 (“The Court considers the validity of the canon to be
beyond debate . . . .”); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Passive Avoidance, 71 STAN. L REV. 513, 516–20 (2019)
(describing the particularly significant role that constitutional avoidance played in the early years of the
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Constitutional avoidance is a generally applicable canon of statutory
construction, invoked across all areas of the law.55 It is not particular to the
immigration context.56 In fact, given the strong hold of the plenary power doctrine
in immigration law, it might reasonably be expected that the canon of constitutional
avoidance would not play any role in immigration cases. Why should courts be
concerned about avoiding significant constitutional questions if the underlying
constitutional rights and protections have no application in the immigration
context?57 In fact, however, courts have regularly and for many years applied the
canon of constitutional avoidance to determine the meaning of statutes in the
immigration context.58 Its use in questions of immigration law is firmly accepted, all
the way up to the Supreme Court.59 In fact, some scholars have argued that the
canon of constitutional avoidance has been overused in immigration cases.60
B. Constitutional Avoidance and Immigration Detention
The remainder of this section will discuss when and how constitutional
avoidance has been used to interpret immigration statutes relating to the detention
of noncitizens by the Supreme Court. It aims not to discuss every single case in
which the canon of constitutional avoidance has played any role, but rather to
provide a representative sampling of cases. It will focus on three major cases over
the last almost forty years in which the Supreme Court relied on the canon of
constitutional avoidance to decide an immigration case involving the detention of

Roberts Supreme Court); Kelley, supra note 51, at 832–33 (tracing the canon back to 1804 and citing
thirty Supreme Court cases in the decade preceding the article in which the canon was invoked or urged
to be invoked by at least one Justice); Motomura, supra note 15, at 561 (“[R]eliance on the canon,
whether stated or unstated, seems to be a fact of everyday judicial life.”).
55. See Slocum, supra note 15, at 375.
56. Slocum, supra note 15, at 375.
57. See, e.g., Slocum, supra note 15, at 375 (“If the plenary power doctrine foreclosed
constitutional challenges, however, there would be little legitimate role for the avoidance canon.”).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 200–01 (1957); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374
U.S. 449, 451 (1963); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001). See
also the immigration detention cases discussed infra Section I.B.
59. Two early examples of the use of constitutional avoidance by the Supreme Court in the
immigration context are Witkovich, 353 U.S. at 194 and Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 449. A prominent and
more modern example is St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289.
60. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 15; cf. Slocum, supra note 15, at 366, 368–69, 376, 384
(“Courts have frequently used this canon in immigration cases, often in what can be described as an
aggressive fashion.” Professor Slocum in his article ultimately argues that substantive canons of
statutory construction, including the canon of constitutional avoidance, have a continued place in
immigration cases.).
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noncitizens: Jean v. Nelson from 1985,61 Zadvydas v. Davis from 2001,62 and Clark
v. Martinez from 2005.63 Its goal is to demonstrate just how entrenched the canon
of constitutional avoidance is in immigration jurisprudence and to trace its use and
development over time prior to the Supreme Court’s consideration of Jennings.
i. Jean v. Nelson
In 1985, in Jean v. Nelson, the Court used constitutional avoidance to
decide a potentially significant case for immigrants’ rights.64 Jean was a class action
lawsuit brought by a group of undocumented Haitians who were denied parole
under a new Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) policy.65 The district court
found that the INS’s policy should have been effected via notice and comment
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) but that petitioners had
failed to prove their Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Claim that they were
discriminated against because of their race and national origin. 66 Following the
district court’s decision, the INS properly promulgated a new parole rule that
“require[d] even-handed treatment and prohibit[ed] the consideration of race and
national origin in the parole decision.”67 The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held
that the APA claim was moot as all parole decisions were made under the new
parole rule and that “the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the consideration of
unadmitted aliens for parole.” 68 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the case to be
remanded to the district court for it to review whether parole decisions were being
made pursuant to the new regulation, which is in an individualized and nondiscriminatory fashion.69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari following the Eleventh Circuit’s en
banc decision.70 Both Petitioners and Respondents urged the Court to reach the
constitutional issue.71 At the time that Jean reached the Supreme Court, scholars
were already predicting the demise of the plenary power doctrine.72 Observers
hoped that Jean would be the Court’s opportunity to move this demise forward in

61. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
62. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
63. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
64. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
65. Id. at 848–49.
66. Id. at 850.
67. Id. at 850–51.
68. Id. at 852.
69. Id. at 852–53.
70. Jean v. Nelson, 469 U.S. 1071, 1071 (1984).
71. Jean, 472 U.S. at 854.
72. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 15, at 547; Stephen Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 296–99; Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57–58 (1984).

2021

IMMIGRATION DETENTION: EROSION OR
REINFORCEMENT OF A THEORY OF IMMIGRATION
EXCEPTIONALISM

729

a more concrete and explicit way. 73 These hopes prior to the Court’s decision in
Jean are strikingly similar to commentary that preceded the Court’s decision in
Jennings, some thirty years later.
The result in Jean, like that in Jennings, was disappointing. Justice
Rehnquist, for a seven-member majority, relied on the canon of constitutional
avoidance rather than addressing the constitutional arguments.74 The Court stated:
“‘Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider
nonconstitutional grounds for decision.’ . . . Of course, the fact that courts should
not decide constitutional issues unnecessarily does not permit a court to press
statutory construction ‘to the point of disingenuous evasion’ to avoid a
constitutional question.”75
The Court discussed the meaning and rationale for the avoidance canon, but
this discussion lasted less than a page, consisted primarily of quotations from prior
cases, and was by no means intensive.76 The Court then criticized the Eleventh
Circuit for jumping to the constitutional issue without first addressing the statute
and the regulation.77 After a very brief discussion of the statute and regulation, the
Court agreed with the en banc Eleventh Circuit that the case should be remanded
to the District Court to determine whether individualized parole decisions without
regard for race or national origin were being made pursuant to the statute and
regulations.78
The application of constitutional avoidance in Jean was conducted in a
somewhat unusual manner. The Court did not consider two or more possible
interpretations of a provision of law, at least one of which presented serious
constitutional questions. Instead, the Court glossed over the question of
interpretation all together by accepting the parties’ interpretation of the statute
and regulation at issue.79 As the dissent pointed out, that interpretation does not
stem directly from the statutory language.80

73. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 15, at 547–48.
74. Jean, 472 U.S. at 855. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, in dissent would have
decided the constitutional issue and held that “petitioners have a Fifth Amendment Right to parole
decisions free from invidious discrimination based on race or national origin.” Id. at 858 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The dissent did not disagree with the majority’s explanation of the canon of constitutional
avoidance but did disagree with the premise that the regulation prohibited consideration of race and
national origin. Id. at 858–59.
75. Id. at 854 (first quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981)); then quoting United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1984).
76. Jean, 472 U.S. at 854.
77. Id. at 854–55.
78. Id. at 857.
79. Id. at 850–51.
80. Id. at 858–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ii. Zadvydas v. Davis
Zadvydas v. Davis, issued at the very end of the Supreme Court’s October
2000 term, was the second immigration case in 2001 where the Supreme Court
invoked constitutional avoidance.81 It was decided just three days after the
Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr, where the Court relied in part on the
canon of constitutional avoidance to hold that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions
of two new statutes did not preclude habeas jurisdiction because to do so would
raise substantial constitutional questions under the suspension clause of the
Constitution.82
In Zadvydas, the Court was concerned with the detention of noncitizens
following a removal order.83 Ordinarily, a detained noncitizen with a removal order
will be physically removed from the United States within a ninety-day statutory
removal period.84 The statute in INA § 241(a)(6) allows for the detention of certain
noncitizens past that ninety-day period when the government has been unable to
remove them.85 The Court in Zadvydas considered the post-removal order
detention of two separate noncitizens: Kestutis Zadvydas and Kim Ho Ma.86 Both
Zadvydas and Ma were deportable as a result of criminal convictions and were
ordered removed.87 When the government was unable to physically remove them,
they remained detained for an extended period of time past the statutory ninetyday period.88 Each filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his
continued detention.89
In Zadvydas’s case, the district court held that Zadvydas’s continued
detention was unconstitutional, but it was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.90 The Fifth Circuit found his detention constitutional because “eventual
deportation was not ‘impossible,’ good faith efforts to remove him from the United
States continued, and his detention was subject to periodic administrative
review.”91 In Ma’s case, the district court also held that Ma’s continued detention
was unconstitutional.92 The Ninth Circuit affirmed his release on statutory grounds,
interpreting the statute in light of the constitutional concerns to prohibit detention

81. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
82. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298–99 (2001).
83. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683.
84. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 477, § 241(a)(1) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) (2020)).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
86. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 685.
91. Id.
92. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686.
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for more than a reasonable time after the statutory ninety-day removal period.93
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, agreeing to hear both the
statutory and constitutional arguments, and consolidated the cases for argument
and decision.94
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme Court, joined
by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg.95 The Court held that, in light
of the serious constitutional concerns presented by indefinite detention, the postremoval period detention provision should be construed to “limit[] an alien’s postremoval-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that
alien’s removal from the United States.”96 “[F]or the sake of uniform administration
in the federal courts,” the Court set a presumptively reasonable period of six
months for continued detention, explaining that, after the six-month period,
continued detention is authorized only if there is a significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future.97
Zadvydas is a typical modern constitutional avoidance case concerned with
the interpretation of a single statutory provision that, depending on how it is
interpreted, may present serious constitutional issues. The most straightforward
reading of the plain text of the statute would seem to authorize indefinite detention
at the will of the executive. The majority opinion for the Court, however, held that
this statutory language was ambiguous.98 In order to avoid “a ‘serious doubt’ with
its constitutionality,” it went well beyond the text of the statute in interpreting it.99
It justifies doing so by citing to an earlier constitutional avoidance case, United
States v. Witkovich, for the proposition that “[w]e have read significant limitations
into other immigration statutes in order to avoid their constitutional
invalidation.”100
The Court’s discussion of the canon of constitutional avoidance itself is, as in
most of the other cases discussed, brief, but its application in the cases before it is
lengthy. The Court began its application with an in-depth analysis of the underlying
constitutional norm, a liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment’s due process
clause.101 Unlike many constitutional avoidance cases, the language of this
constitutional analysis is strong and definite. The Court leaves no doubt and
acknowledges no remaining questions regarding its conclusion that the
interpretation most consistent with the plain language of the statute violates the
due process rights of detainees like Zadvydas and Ma. Given the decisive nature of

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 681.
96. Id. at 689.
97. Id. at 701.
98. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 697.
99. Id. at 689 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
100. Zadvyas, 533 U.S. at 689 (citing United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 195 (1957)).
101. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–92.
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its conclusion, one might wonder why the Court did not simply decide the case on
a constitutional basis rather than employing constitutional avoidance. The Court
attempts to answer this question itself, framing its choice as a simple,
straightforward application of the avoidance canon – Congress did not make its
intent to authorize indefinite detention in the statute sufficiently clear, so the Court
will interpret the statutory language to avoid the “serious constitutional threat.” 102
The Court explicitly acknowledges the plenary power doctrine in its
decision.103 It does not question its identity as a foundational doctrine in
immigration law, or its application in the instant case. In fact, in some respects the
Court subscribes to an expansive interpretation of the doctrine, discussing the need
for the judiciary to defer not only to the legislature but to the executive as well. 104
The Court does, however, draw language from other cases, including Chae Chan
Ping itself, to argue that the plenary power doctrine does not mean that Congress’
power over immigration is unlimited:
[T]hat power is subject to important constitutional limitations. See INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 . . . (1983) (Congress must choose “a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing” that power); The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 . . . (1889) (congressional
authority limited “by the Constitution itself and considerations of public
policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized
nations”).105
In this respect, then, the Court endorses only a very weak version of the
doctrine.
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Rehnquist dissented from the Court’s
opinion.106 In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the dissenting justices argue
that the majority improperly invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance. 107 They
accuse the Court of “misunderstand[ing] the principle of constitutional avoidance
which it seeks to invoke.”108 The dissent takes the position that constitutional
avoidance allows the Court to select between “fairly possible” constructions of the

102. Id. at 696–99.
103. Id. at 695.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 695.
106. All four dissenters join Part I of Justice Kennedy’s dissent, discussed here, regarding the
interpretation of the statute. Id. at 702, 706–18 (5-4 opinion) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas would have held that noncitizens like Zadvydas and Ma had no
constitutional right to release. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Part II of Justice Kennedy’s dissent, not
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justices Kennedy and Rehnquist acknowledge that post-removal
order detention might present constitutional issues in some cases, but argue that this is not so in the
cases before the Court. Id. at 718–25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
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statute and would hold that the majority’s construction of the post-removal order
detention statute is not plausible: “The requirement the majority reads into the law
simply bears no relation to the text; and in fact it defeats the statutory purpose and
design.”109 The dissent distinguishes Witkovich by finding that there, the limitation
in the statue was consistent with the statutory purpose, whereas in the instant case,
the limitation was contrary to congressional intent.110
iii. Clark v. Martinez
In Clark v. Martinez,111 the Supreme Court was interpreting the same
statutory provision, INA § 241(a)(6),112 that was at issue in Zadvydas v. Davis.113
Instead of being concerned with the detention of deportable noncitizens after the
statutory removal period, however, Clark involved the post-removal order
detention of inadmissible noncitizens.114 Clark concerned the detention of two
separate noncitizens, Sergio Suarez Martinez and Daniel Benitez. 115 Both Martinez
and Benitez were Cubans who had come to the United States through the Mariel
boatlift in 1980 and had been subsequently paroled into the United States. 116 Each
had a number of criminal convictions in the United States that rendered him
ineligible for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residency under the Cuban
Adjustment Act.117 As a result, both were placed into removal/exclusion
proceedings and ordered removed/excluded from the United States. 118 Due to the
lack of a repatriation agreement with Cuba, neither was able to be removed and
both remained detained following the expiration of the statutory removal period.119

109. Id.
110. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 709–10.
111. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 377–78 (2005).
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2014).
113. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
114. Clark, 543 U.S. at 373.
115. Id. at 374–77.
116. Id. at 374.
117. Id. at 374–75.
118. Id. at 375. Benitez was placed into proceedings prior to the changes made by IIRIRA taking
effect in 1996 and was therefore placed into exclusion proceedings and ordered excluded. Martinez was
placed into proceedings in 2000, after IIRIRA, and was therefore charged as inadmissible and ordered
removed. Id. at 375 n.2.
119. Id. at 375–76.
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Justice Scalia, after dissenting in Zadvydas,120 wrote the majority opinion
in Clark. He was joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer.122 The Court held that because INA § 241(a)(6) had been interpreted in
Zadvydas as allowing detention of deportable noncitizens for only as long as was
reasonably necessary to effectuate their deportation it must be interpreted in the
same way for inadmissible noncitizens.123 That is, the same statutory provision
cannot be interpreted differently in different contexts.124 Although the Court
provides only limited citations for this principle, it appears to treat it as a generally
applicable principle of statutory construction.125 The Court gives examples from
other contexts, including interpretations resulting from the application of the rule
of lenity.126
While the Court does not describe the canon of constitutional avoidance as
being the primary basis for its decision, Clark can be construed as a constitutional
avoidance case. The Court explains that “when deciding which of two plausible
statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary
consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional
problems, the other should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems
pertain to the particular litigant before the Court.”127 The Court was, then, relying
at least in part on the canon of constitutional avoidance to reach its decision.
This characterization is further borne out by the fact that the Court in Clark
does discuss the canon of constitutional avoidance and its invocation in Zadvydas
at length.128 Indeed, the Court’s discussion of constitutional avoidance in Clark is
more detailed and less formulaic than its treatment in many cases where resolution
did turn on the canon. The Court emphasized throughout its decision that the canon
is a tool of statutory interpretation, not a means for the Court to make
constitutional determinations.129 The Court also noted on multiple occasions that
121

120. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702–05.
121. Clark, 534 U.S. at 372–87. Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in Zadvydas taking the
position that the Court should have held that Zadvydas and Ma had no constitutional right at stake,
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and joined Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion
arguing that the majority wrongly applied the canon of constitutional avoidance because their
interpretation of the statute was not plausible. Id. at 702, 706–18 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
122. Clark, 534 U.S. at 372. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy also wrote a dissenting opinion in
Zadvyas. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705–25. Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in Clark to
emphasize that detention of inadmissible noncitizens ordered removed for longer than six months
remains possible. Clark, 534 U.S. at 387–88.
123. Clark, 534 U.S. at 378, 380–81.
124. Id. at 378, 380–81.
125. Id. at 380. The dissent, as discussed infra, disagrees with this characterization. Id. at 392–
401 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 380.
127. Id. at 380–81.
128. Id. at 380–82, 385.
129. Clark, 534 U.S. at 380–82, 385.
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the canon did not allow the courts to interpret a statute in any way they pleased
but was rather a means of selecting between two or more reasonable
interpretations. Summing up both of these considerations, the Court stated: “[O]ne
of the canon’s chief justifications is that it allows courts to avoid the decision of
constitutional questions. It is a tool for choosing between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that
Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional
doubts.”130
Justice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in Clark, joined in part by
Chief Justice Rehnquist.131 Justice Thomas characterizes the majority’s conclusion
in the case as flowing from the canon of constitutional avoidance, not as a general
principle of statutory interpretation.132 As a result of this conclusion, he goes on to
argue that what he calls the majority’s “lowest common denominator principle” is
inconsistent with the canon of constitutional avoidance.133 Justice Thomas’s dissent
discusses the canon of constitutional avoidance even more extensively than does
the majority opinion.134 He traces the development of constitutional avoidance
from a principle that required the courts to determine that a construction of the
statute was in fact unconstitutional to one that also responded to “constitutional
doubts.”135 He then argues that, in the typical case, courts have always analyzed the
constitutional question as to only the plaintiff before the court, not as to third
parties.136
Finally, Justice Thomas in dissent argues that Zadvydas was wrongly decided
and should not be accorded stare decisis effect.137 He focuses on the fact that the
canon of constitutional avoidance was inappropriately applied because the statute
is not ambiguous and because the decision is really a constitutional decision in
disguise.138
C. Preliminary Observations
Several conclusions can be drawn about the statue of canon of constitutional
avoidance and the plenary power doctrine prior to the Supreme Court’s

130. Id. at 381.
131. Id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined as to Part I.A only, the portion of
the dissent that argued that the majority’s interpretation of the Court’s decision in Zadvydas was
implausible because it failed to acknowledge the distinction Zadvydas made between inadmissible and
deportable noncitizens. Id. at 388–92.
132. Id. at 388–401.
133. Id. at 395–401.
134. Id. at 388–404.
135. Clark, 534 U.S. at 395 (citing, inter alia, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
136. Id. at 395–98.
137. Id. at 401–04.
138. Id. at 401–04.
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consideration of Jennings v. Rodriguez from this discussion of Jean, Zadvydas, and
Clark. First, the use of constitutional avoidance in immigration detention cases
specifically and immigration cases generally was well established and provided
courts with considerable discretion to interpret statutes to avoid constitutional
problems. Second, this use was both encouraged by and further entrenched the
plenary power doctrine and a theory of immigration exceptionalism. While
nominally protecting the rights of immigrants, reliance on constitutional avoidance
rather than directly considering the underlying constitutional issue may have in fact
made immigrants more vulnerable. This section will discuss each of these
conclusions in turn.
i. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Jean, Zadvydas, and Clark demonstrate that the application of the canon of
constitutional avoidance in immigration detention cases is uncontroversial. Both
the last resort rule and modern constitutional avoidance are reflected in the
Supreme Court’s immigration detention jurisprudence. Jean is one example of the
application of the less common last resort rule. As a result, it is sometimes not
discussed in analyses of the Supreme Court’s invocation of constitutional avoidance
in immigration cases.139 The last resort rule is, however, generally considered part
of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance140 and Jean is a relevant part of the
conversation here. Zadvydas is one example of the application of modern
constitutional avoidance. If Clark is read as a constitutional avoidance case, it would
also fall into this category.
In both the last resort rule cases and the modern avoidance cases, the content
of the rule itself is relatively straightforward and unchanging. The basic meaning of
the canon of constitutional avoidance is not a heavily litigated or discussed issue.
The more difficult questions in constitutional avoidance are the closely related
questions of when and how the canon should be invoked.141
With respect to when, I mean when the application of the doctrine is
triggered. Is constitutional avoidance an absolute rule, or do courts have some
leeway in deciding when to exercise it and when to decide constitutional issues
directly? When is a potential constitutional issue “serious” enough to prompt use
of the canon? With respect to how, I mean how far can and should a court go in
interpreting a statute to avoid constitutional issues. Otherwise stated, what is the

139. Compare Das, supra note 13, at 498–501 with Motomura, supra note 15, at 577–78, 590–
93.
140. See Young, supra note 30, at 1574–75; Kloppenberg, supra note 29. But see Krishnakumar,
supra note 54, at 544 (describing the last resort rule as a related procedural doctrine rather than a
variation of the constitutional avoidance canon).
141. Cf. Kloppenberg, supra note 29, at 1028 (discussing specifically the last resort rule) (“The
critical problem facing a judge as she implements the doctrine of avoiding unnecessary constitutional
decisions is determining which constitutional determinations are necessary and when those
determinations become necessary.”).
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line between permissible construction of a statute Congress has written and
impermissible judicial re-writing of that statute?142 I note that these questions are
closely related because the answer to the question of how often drives the answer
to the question of when. That is, the doctrine of modern avoidance instructs courts
to choose between plausible constructions of the statute to avoid constitutional
issues. How much leeway a Court has before a construction becomes implausible
may determine whether or not constitutional avoidance comes into play.
The Court in Zadvydas and by extension in Clark added significant limitations
to the relevant statute’s reach that were tied only loosely, if at all, to the plain
language of the statute.143 While precise line drawing is not possible, the answer to
these questions of when and how prior to the Court’s decision in Jennings then
appeared to be quite far—that is, courts had significant leeway to determine when
to invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance and significant latitude in how to
interpret a statute to avoid constitutional problems. The Court in Clark did use some
language indicating an intent to narrow these answers, repeatedly emphasizing
that the possible multiple interpretations of the statute must all be plausible. 144 This
language was tempered, however, by the fact that the Clark Court did ultimately
endorse Zadvydas’s broad interpretation of the statutory language.
ii. The Plenary Power Doctrine
If a strong interpretation of the plenary power doctrine and immigration
exceptionalism had governed, the Court in all three cases could have said that they
would not interfere with the process and rights set out by Congress and the
executive. In fact, the Court did not so hold in any of the three cases. All three cases
did enforce, if not explicitly recognize, some level of constitutional or subconstitutional protection for noncitizens.
The Court’s decision in Jean was perhaps the weakest of the three in this
regard, but nevertheless acknowledged some rights for noncitizens. This may be
attributed at least in part to the fact that Jean was, as discussed above, a “last resort
rule” constitutional avoidance case.145 The Court in Jean did not recognize a Fifth
Amendment equal protection right against discrimination based on race or national
origin for noncitizens in immigration proceedings.146 The Court did, however, hold
that the statute and the regulations required parole determinations to be made in
an individualized and non-discriminatory manner, and remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether immigration officers were in fact complying

142. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 463 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“I dissent from
the Court’s judgment and opinion because ‘statutory construction’ means to me that the Court can
construe statutes but it cannot construct them.”).
143. See supra Sections I.B.2–3.
144. Clark, 534 U.S. at 380–82, 385.
145. See supra Section I.B.1.
146. Jean, 472 U.S. at 852–53; Motomura, supra note 15 at 590–93.
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with these requirements.147 In essence, the Court in Jean made a small step forward
in recognizing immigrants’ rights, rather than the larger, more decisive step
requested by the litigants and their advocates.
The Court’s decisions in Zadvydas and Clark provided more robust protection
to noncitizens’ rights in immigration proceedings. The Court in Zadvydas and Clark
protected a Fifth Amendment due process liberty interest by holding that INA §
241(a)(6) allowed post-removal order detention of both deportable and
inadmissible noncitizens for only so long as reasonably necessary to effectuate their
deportation.148
It is difficult to criticize decisions that resulted in the advancement of rights
and protections for noncitizens and were perhaps the best realistic outcome given
the plenary power doctrine and other existing political impediments to advancing
immigrants’ rights. In some respects, these cases can be viewed as slowly chipping
away at the plenary power doctrine by their incremental recognition of the
constitutional rights of noncitizens. However, the use of the canon of constitutional
avoidance instead of directly confronting constitutional issues has led to a number
of problems. Professor Motomura suggested more than thirty years ago that
constitutional avoidance was a transitional phase that would lead to the recognition
of actual constitutional rights, but recognized that some constitutional norms
seemed to have gotten “stuck” in the transition even then. 149 The continued
reliance on the canon of constitutional avoidance by the Supreme Court in the three
cases discussed above shows that a number of norms remain stuck now, three
decades later. As a result, a number of the concerns identified by Professor
Motomura, awkward or unpredictable solutions; misdirected judicial review; and a
lack of dialogue, particularly regarding the future of immigration law, continue to
occur today.150
In addition, the canon of constitutional avoidance has in some respects
further entrenched the plenary power doctrine. It enables courts to avoid
addressing the plenary power doctrine, thereby allowing the plenary power
doctrine to continue to exist. 151 In fact, constitutional avoidance not only does not
lead to the demise of the plenary power doctrine, it actually promotes its continued

147. Jean, 472 U.S. at 852–53.
148. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–96; Clark, 534 U.S. at 378, 380–81. See also supra Sections I.B.2–
3.
149. Motomura, supra note 15; cf. Das supra note 13, at 538 (“The development of constitutional
principles in immigration has stagnated.”).
150. Motomura, supra note 15, at 600–13.
151. See, e.g., Das, supra note 13, at 501 (“Although not fully liberated from the dictates of the
plenary power doctrine or years of precedent recognizing limitations on the extent to which immigrants
may avail themselves of certain constitutional protections, federal courts have taken steps forward to
enforce constitutional norms through statutory interpretation.”). Professor Das analyzes the use of
constitutional avoidance by the Supreme Court in Witkovich, St. Cyr, Zadvydas, and Clark before arguing
that the impact of the federal courts is limited and the executive branch should play a greater role in
developing and enforcing constitutional norms in immigration cases. Id. at 498–502, 538–39.
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hegemony. By allowing courts to avoid directly addressing constitutional rights for
noncitizens in immigration proceedings, constitutional avoidance to some degree
perpetuates the position that noncitizens have no such constitutional rights. The
effect is circular—the plenary power doctrine pushed courts to rely on the canon
of constitutional avoidance instead of directly confronting constitutional issues and
the application of the canon of constitutional avoidance reinforces the continued
viability of the plenary power doctrine.
Finally, the use of the canon of constitutional avoidance has led to ambiguity
and uncertainty in the applicability and interpretation of some constitutional norms
in the immigration context. For example, despite the extensive discussion and
strong language finding a Fifth Amendment due process liberty interest for
detained noncitizens in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court just two years later in Demore
v. Kim found no Fifth Amendment liberty interest for a different group of detained
immigrants.152 Because Zadvydas was decided based on an interpretation of the
statute (albeit on the basis of constitutional avoidance) rather than on an
interpretation of the Constitution, there was no direct precedent to prevent the
Court’s problematic decision in Demore. This has the effect of increasing
unpredictability for noncitizens, a group already particularly vulnerable to
insecurity and instability.
III. JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ
A. State of the Law on Immigration Detention
As discussed in subsection I.C above, the applicability of constitutional
avoidance in immigration detention cases and the basic substance of the canon
appear well-settled in Jean, Zadvydas, and Clark. On the other hand, the substantive
issue at stake, immigration detention, has been and remains a live controversy.
Noncitizens continue to challenge various aspects of their detention for
immigration purposes.153 The lower federal courts wrestle with interpreting and
analyzing the constitutionality of the various statutes authorizing the detention of
different categories of noncitizens during different portions of their removal
proceedings. One illustration of the tangled and inconsistent mess of these cases is
a third case on the detention of noncitizens decided by the Supreme Court in 2003,
in between its decisions in Zadvydas and Clark—Demore v. Kim.154
Instead of the post-removal order detention challenged in Zadvydas and
Clark, Demore concerned the mandatory detention with no possibility for bond of
a noncitizen while his removal proceedings were pending. 155 Hyung Joon Kim, a

152. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–96; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Section I.B.2, infra.
Demore v. Kim will be discussed in more detail infra Section II.A.
153. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018).
154. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
155. Id.
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Korean citizen and lawful permanent resident with convictions for burglary and
petty theft, challenged his detention under INA § 236(c), a statute that mandated
the detention of noncitizens with particular types of criminal convictions in certain
circumstances while their removal proceedings are pending.156 The Court’s decision
in Demore involved substantial disagreement among the Justices and a resulting
mess of concurring and dissenting opinions.157 Unlike the opinions for the Court in
Zadvydas and Clark, however, none of the Justices, with the possible exception of
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, relied on the canon of constitutional avoidance
to decide the case. Instead, they confronted the constitutional issue directly.
Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Zadvydas and Clark,158 wrote the opinion
of the Court, joined in full by Justice Kennedy.159 Part I of his opinion, finding habeas
jurisdiction over Kim’s constitutional challenge to his detention, was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.160 The remainder of his opinion,
holding that Kim’s mandatory detention did not violate his right to due process
under the Fifth Amendment, was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas.161 In finding Kim’s detention constitutional, Justice Rehnquist emphasized
the purpose of the detention, to compel noncitizens to attend their removal
proceedings, and the relatively short length of the detention required, which the
Court describes as “roughly a month and a half” in those cases where the noncitizen

156. Id. at 513. INA § 236(c)(1)(B) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B)) provides that “[t]he Attorney General
shall take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense
covered in section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) . . . when the alien is released . . . .” The
government alleged that Kim was deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(a)(ii), multiple crimes involving
moral turpitude, and INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), aggravated felonies, as a result of his criminal convictions.
Id. at 513 n.1.
157. Justice O’Connor authored a concurring opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas arguing
against habeas jurisdiction. Id. at 533–40. Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion to emphasize
his belief that pre-final removal order detention could, under some circumstances not present in the
instant case, violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 531–33. Justice Souter
authored an opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurring regarding habeas jurisdiction
and dissenting on the constitutional issue, asserting instead that Kim’s mandatory detention violated
due process. Id. at 540–76. Finally, Justice Breyer authored an opinion concurring on habeas jurisdiction
and dissenting on the Constitutional issue for reasons different than Justice Souter’s dissent. Id. at 576–
79. Justice Breyer’s dissent will be discussed in this section below.
158. In Zadvydas, Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent, which argued (1) that the
majority improperly applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance because their construction of the
statute is implausible and (2) that post-removal order detention might present constitutional issues in
some cases but did not in the cases currently before the Court. 533 U.S. at 706–25. In Clark, Justice
Rehnquist joined the portion of Justice Thomas’ dissent that argued that the majority’s interpretation of
the Court’s decision in Zadvydas was implausible because it failed to acknowledge the distinction
Zadvydas made between inadmissible and deportable noncitizens. 534 U.S. at 388–92.
159. Demore, 538 U.S. at 512–13.
160. Id. at 512, 516–17.
161. Id. at 512–16, 517–31.
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does not appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 162 Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion further emphasized the importance of the length of the
detention, noting that a lawful permanent resident “could be entitled to an
individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the
continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” 163
As mentioned above, Justice Breyer came the closest of any of the Justices in
Demore to invoking constitutional avoidance.164 In his dissenting opinion, he argued
that INA § 236(c) should be interpreted to require an individualized assessment of
flight risk and dangerousness for noncitizens who were raising good faith,
substantial challenges to their removability on the grounds that were also the basis
for their detention.165 Justice Breyer did not mention the canon of constitutional
avoidance by name and did not discuss the substance of the doctrine.166 However,
he noted that his interpretation of the statute was “consistent with what the
Constitution demands” and he cited to the constitutional avoidance cases Zadvydas
and Witkovich in support of his decision to so interpret the statute.167
In the years following Zadvydas, Demore, and Clark, courts struggled to
reconcile the approaches and outcomes of the three cases as they decided other
challenges to immigration detention raised by noncitizens.168 Demore obviously
presented particular issues for noncitizens challenging their detention during
removal proceedings, but some courts agreed with interpretations limiting Demore
to its facts and arguing for bond hearings for immigrants detained for longer periods
of time.169 Some ammunition in this battle came when, in August 2016, the Solicitor
General submitted a letter to the Supreme Court acknowledging “several significant
errors” in the data it had provided to the Court in Demore.170 These errors meant
that the average length of detention for a noncitizen in pending removal
proceedings was actually 382 days, not the 47 days reported to the Court at the
time Demore was decided.171 Since, as discussed previously, the short length of the
detention was a major factor in the Court’s decision in Demore,172 this revelation

162. Id. at 517–31.
163. Id. at 532–33.
164. Id. at 576–79.
165. Demore, 538 U.S. at 576–79.
166. See Demore, 538 U.S. 510.
167. Id. at 578–79.
168. See Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory Interpretation
in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 157 (2015).
169. See, e.g., id. at 157–58.
170. Letter from Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor Gen., to Hon. Scott S. Harris, Clerk,
Supreme Court (Aug. 26, 2016); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
171. Gershengorn, supra note 170; Demore, 538 U.S. 510.
172. Demore, 538 U.S. at 517–33.
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provided support to judges and advocates seeking to distinguish cases with a longer
period of detention and even to call for limiting or overruling Demore.173
Questions regarding the plenary power doctrine, the application of
constitutional law in immigration cases, the canon of constitutional avoidance and
immigration detention came to a head in many of these immigration detention
cases, including Jennings v. Rodriguez.
B. Jennings v. Rodriguez: Pre-Supreme Court Proceedings
Jennings v. Rodriguez originated in two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
by immigration detainees in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California in 2007.174 The detainees were challenging their detention under, inter
alia, two sections of the INA § 235(b), applying to applicants for admission, and §
236(a) and (c), governing discretionary and mandatory detention during removal
proceedings.175 The cases were consolidated and the petitioners moved for class
certification.176 The case then bounced back and forth between the district court
and the Ninth Circuit for a number of years. 177
Finally, in 2013, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision (referred to as Rodriguez
II) affirming the district court’s unpublished order granting a preliminary injunction
in favor of the class members.178 The district court then granted summary judgment
and issued a permanent injunction in favor of the class members requiring, inter
alia, the government to hold bond hearings in the cases of noncitizens detained
under the authority of several different statutory provisions.179 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the permanent injunction in 2015 in an opinion referred to as Rodriguez
III.180 The Ninth Circuit held that allowing indefinite detention of these noncitizens
during their removal proceedings would raise substantial constitutional concerns
and therefore interpreted the statute to provide for these regular bond hearings. 181

173. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 8, 12–13, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018);
Lukaj v. McAleenan, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1269–70, 1273–74 (M.D. Fla. 2019).
174. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (Herein after Rodriguez III).
175. Rodriguez v. Holder, No. CV 07-3239 TJH (RNBx), 2013 WL 5229795, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6,
2013).
176. Id.
177. Rodriguez III, at 1065–66, 1071–72.
178. See, Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2013) (Herein after Rodriguez
II).
179. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d 1127 at 3.
180. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1074.
181. Id.
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The remainder of Subsection II.B will discuss the use of the canon of constitutional
avoidance in Jennings by the Ninth Circuit.182
In Rodriguez II, the Ninth Circuit panel structured its substantive analysis of
the detention provisions at stake through the framework of constitutional
avoidance.183 Its initial discussion of the canon is a classic example of modern
avoidance, citing to the standard Crowell v. Benson without much elaboration.184
The court does emphasize that its interpretation must not override congressional
intent so as not “to usurp the policy-making and legislative functions of duly-elected
representatives.”185 The court later relies on Clark v. Martinez to hold that, because
some applications of INA § 235(b) would raise constitutional concerns, all of INA §
235(b) must be interpreted to avoid those concerns.186 The Ninth Circuit explained:
[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that, where one possible
application of a statute raises constitutional concerns, the statute as a
whole should be construed through the prism of constitutional
avoidance. . . . Thus, the dispositive question is not whether the
government’s reading of [§ 235(b)] is permissible in some (or even
most) cases, but rather whether there is any single application of the
statute that calls for a limiting construction.187
The Ninth Circuit concluded briefly, relying on Zadvydas as limited by Demore,
(1) that there is a due process liberty interest in freedom from imprisonment and
(2) that at least indefinite immigration detention would raise “serious constitutional
concerns.”188 To avoid raising these due process concerns, the panel interpreted
the relevant statutory provisions, INA §§ 235(b) and 236(c), as including a temporal
limitation.189 That is, the statutes only applied so long as the length of the detention
was reasonable, less than six months.190 Once that reasonable period of detention
was exceeded, federal authorization for the detention shifted to a discretionary

182. The district court’s discussion of constitutional avoidance appears to have been contained
primarily in its unpublished order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the class members. See,
Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1132–33. In its decision granting the permanent injunction, the district court
simply refers back to its order granting the preliminary injunction and to the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 decision
affirming it in Rodriguez II. Rodriguez, 2013 WL 5229795, at *1–2
183. Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1133–34.
184. Id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
185. Id. (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741 (1984)).
186. Id. at 1141
187. Id. (INA § 235(b) corresponds to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2009)).
188. Id. at 1134. The court then engaged in an extended discussion of its own prior precedent
construing the intersection and application of Zadyvdas and Demore. Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1134–36.
189. Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1137–39, 1144 (INA § 235(b) corresponds to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
(2009); INA § 236(c) corresponds to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2009)).
190. Id. at 1137–39, 1144.
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detention statute, INA § 236(a), allowing bond hearings for those who remained
detained.191
In contrast, in Rodriguez III the Ninth Circuit panel began with a extended
discussion (relative to Rodriguez II) of the due process liberty interest at stake in
civil detention generally and in immigration cases specifically. 192 In addition to
discussing the constitutionality of immigration detention at greater length, the
Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez III appears to go further than it did in Rodriguez II towards
concluding that prolonged immigration detention is actually unconstitutional
rather than simply presenting serious constitutional questions.193 The Ninth Circuit
then went on to hold that Rodriguez II was the “law of the case and law of the
circuit” and therefore could not be revisited. 194 The Rodriguez III court did not add
anything to Rodriguez II’s discussion of constitutional avoidance.
While the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Rodriguez II and Rodriguez III are
certainly an extension of the law, they do not represent radical advances with
respect either to the canon of constitutional avoidance or to immigration
exceptionalism. The Court’s discussion of constitutional avoidance lacks detail
beyond its unremarkable recitation of the standard. The Ninth Circuit references
Congress’ “plenary” power over immigration explicitly only in a footnote in
Rodriguez III.195 In fact, other Circuits reached similar conclusions for similar
reasons.196
C. Jennings v. Rodriguez: Before the Supreme Court
Both procedurally and substantively, Jennings v. Rodriguez has a particularly
protracted and complicated history before the Supreme Court. Subsection II.C.1 will
examine the extended proceedings before the Supreme Court, while Subsection
II.C.2 will analyze the decision of the Supreme Court.

191. Id. at 1144 (INA § 236(a) corresponds to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2009)).
192. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1074–78.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1080, and 1084.
195. Id. at 1090 n.12 (asserting that the Court in Rodriguez II had considered and rejected the
government’s arguments regarding “the political branches’ plenary control of the borders”). Despite this
assertion, Congress’s plenary power is not a topic that the court in Rodriguez II had addressed explicitly.
196. Brief for Respondents at 14, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (“All six circuits to
consider the question . . . read the statute to include an implicit reasonable time limitation.”); Reid v.
Donelan, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016) opinion withdrawn on reconsideration, Nos. 14-1270, 14–803, 14–
1823, 2018 WL 4000993, at *1 (1st Cir. May 11, 2018); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015)
vacated sub nom, Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 1260; Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221, 232–
33 (3d Cir. 2011) (reaching this holding as a constitutional matter); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir.
2003) abrogated by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199
(11th Cir. 2016) vacated as moot, 890 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2018).
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i. Proceedings before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jennings v. Rodriguez in June 2016
and the case was initially scheduled to be heard in the October 2016 term. 197 In this
initial round of briefing, the government relied heavily on the theory of immigration
exceptionalism, arguing explicitly that immigration is different and the Ninth
Circuit’s decisions in Rodriguez II and III conflicted with the plenary power
doctrine.198 They rejected what they described as a “supersized” application of the
canon of constitutional avoidance to effect a wholesale rewriting of the laws
relating to immigration detention and asserted that the proper remedy for
prolonged detention was individual petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.199
Rodriguez, unsurprisingly, took the position that the Ninth Circuit had decided
the case correctly, arguing that the government’s detention regime raised serious
constitutional problems and that constitutional avoidance should be applied to
interpret the governing detention statutes as not allowing for prolonged detention
with no hearing.200 Rodriguez distinguished Demore on the grounds that the
subclass members in Rodriguez had not conceded removability and were subject to
prolonged, not brief, detention.201
Responding to the government’s assertion of the plenary power doctrine,
Rodriguez attempted to cabin the doctrine to Congress’ power to admit noncitizens
and cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas in support of the proposition
that the doctrine was subject to important constitutional limitations where
freedom from physical restraint was at stake.202
Oral argument was held on November 30, 2016.203 Unlike in the parties’ briefs,
the plenary power doctrine was not raised.204 The parties’ arguments, and the
Justices’ questions, focused primarily on whether this was an appropriate use of
constitutional avoidance.205 Some of the Justices also suggested concern with the
direct constitutionality of the detention regime and its role in the case. 206
Following oral argument, in December 2016, the Supreme Court issued an
order directing the parties to submit briefs addressing the constitutional issues

197. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489, 2489 (2016).
198. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
199. Id.
200. Brief for Respondents at 14, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
201. Id. at 12–13.
202. Id. at 17–19.
203. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204).
204. Id.
205. Id.; see also Kevin Johnson, Argument Analysis: Immigrant detention and the Constitution,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2016, 11:28 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/12/argument-analysisimmigrant-detention-and-the-constitution/.
206. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204).
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directly.207 The government did not contest that noncitizens subject to immigration
detention possessed due process rights protecting against arbitrary deprivations of
liberty.208 They did argue, however, that these rights were adequately protected by
existing substantive and procedural safeguards and that a rigid six month rule for
bond hearings was neither constitutionally required nor advisable.209 While the
government did not discuss the plenary power doctrine extensively, Congress’
plenary power over immigration was invoked briefly several times. 210 Rodriguez
argued to the contrary that existing processes did not adequately protect
detainees’ due process rights and that, because the due process clause prohibits
prolonged and arbitrary detention, custody hearings were constitutionally required
after six months.211
During this period, following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February
2016 and prior to the confirmation of his ultimate successor Justice Neil Gorsuch in
April 2017, the Supreme Court was operating with only eight Justices.212 Apparently
deadlocked, in June 2017 the Court rescheduled Jennings for reargument in the
October 2017 term.213 Reargument was held on October 3, 2017 before a now full
bench.214 The parties’ arguments here focused on the direct constitutional issues
from the second set of briefs. 215 Arguments regarding immigration exceptionalism
and the extent of the plenary power doctrine featured heavily.216 There was
significant excitement following oral argument about the very real possibility
presented by Jennings for the Justices to not only clarify the constitutional limits on
immigration detention but also redefine the role of immigration exceptionalism and
the plenary power doctrine in modern immigration law. 217

207. Order, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204).
208. Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 151204).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Supplemental Brief for the Respondents, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No.
15-1204).
212. See Adam Liptak and Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2017).
213. Kevin Johnson, No Decision in Two Immigration-Enforcement Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26,
2017, 4:02 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/no-decision-two-immigration-enforcementcases/.
214. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204).
215. Id.; see also Kevin Johnson, Argument Analysis: Justices Seem Primed to Find Constitutional
Limits on the Detention of Immigrants, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 4, 2017, 12:44 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/argument-analysis-justices-seem-primed-find-constitutionallimits-detention-immigrants/.
216. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204);
Johnson, Argument Analysis, supra note 215.
217. See, e.g., Johnson, Argument Analysis, supra note 215; Philip L. Torrey, Jennings v. Rodriguez
and the Future of Immigration Detention, 20 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 171 (2017).
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In November 2017, after reargument had already been held but before a
decision was issued, Justice Kagan recused herself from the case. 218
ii. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court finally released its much-awaited decision in Jennings on
February 27, 2018.219 As evidenced by the patchwork of majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions joined in various part by the remaining eight Justices, the Court
had some difficulty in reaching agreement on its resolution of the case. 220 Justice
Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, except with regard to Part II of his opinion,
where he addressed the Court’s jurisdiction.221 In Parts III through V of his opinion,
Justice Alito held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the constitutional avoidance
doctrine because its construction of each of the three detention provisions at stake
was “implausible.” 222 He explained that identifying a constitutional issue did not
authorize a court to rewrite at statute but only to “choos[e] between competing
plausible interpretations of a statutory text.”223 The opinion described Zadvydas as
“a notably generous application of the constitutional-avoidance canon,” but
stopped short of suggesting it was wrongly decided.224 Instead, Justice Alito
distinguished the plain language of the pre-final removal order statutory provisions
at issue in Jennings from the post-final removal order provision interpreted in
Zadvydas.225
Justice Alito concluded that the Ninth Circuit “had no occasion to consider
respondents’ constitutional arguments on their merits” and remanded the case for
the Ninth Circuit to consider those arguments “in the first instance.” 226 In closing,
he also recommended that the Ninth Circuit reconsider the issue of class

218. In a letter to the parties, the Clerk of the Supreme Court explained that Justice Kagan was
recusing herself because she had just learned that, as Solicitor General, she had “authorized the filing of
a pleading in an earlier phase of this case.” Letter from Hon. Scott S. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court (Nov.
10, 2017), Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204); see also Amy Howe, Kagan Recuses
from
Immigrant-Detention
Case,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov.
10,
2017,
10:16
PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/kagan-recuses-immigrant-detention-case/.
219. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 836–852.
222. Id. at 842–52. Part I of the opinion describes the statutory scheme and the facts and
procedural history of the case. Id. at 836–39.
223. Id. at 842 (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 381).
224. Id. at 843.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 851. But see Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1074–78 (discussing the constitutional issue).
Observers have also noted that it is not entirely accurate to say that the Ninth Circuit did not consider
the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Anil Kalhan (@kalhan), TWITTER (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://twitter.com/kalhan/status/968523672309858304.
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certification in litigation that would now be focused on constitutional due process
claims.227 Justice Alito implicitly accepted that noncitizen detainees in all categories
were due some level of constitutional protection. However, despite the Court’s
order requesting briefing on the constitutional issues and the October 2017
reargument focusing almost exclusively on these issues, Justice Alito carefully
offered no comment or opinion on the constitutionality of the various immigration
detention provisions.
Justice Alito did not invoke the plenary power doctrine by name or
implication.228 While he asserted the Government’s necessary power to decide who
may enter and remain in the country (without citation) at the beginning of his
description of the statutory scheme in Part I of the opinion, he did not belabor the
point or rely on it.229 Instead, Justice Alito treated the case as a straightforward
question of statutory interpretation and the proper application of the canon of
constitutional avoidance.230 Nowhere in his opinion, even in his response to Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Part IV, did he allude to immigration
exceptionalism.231 He did not assert that immigration law was in any way different
or special or allege that the instant case was subject to anything other than the
general rules of statutory interpretation.232
Justices Roberts and Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s decision in full.233 Justice
Sotomayor joined part III.C of Justice Alito’s decision, which overturned the Ninth
Circuit’s requirement of additional bond hearings for those noncitizens already
entitled to a bond hearing under INA § 236(a) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). 234 Justice Thomas
wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgement. 235 Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, would have held that that the Court had no
jurisdiction, vacated the permanent injunction, and remanded for the court to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.236 They joined Justice Alito’s opinion because a
majority of the court had decided to exercise jurisdiction and they agreed with

227. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851–52. Observers have also noted that, while the government
aggressively litigated the class certification issue before the district court and the Ninth Circuit, they did
not seek certiorari on that question and it was not before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Adam Cox
(@adambcox), TWITTER, (Feb. 27, 2018), https://twitter.com/adambcox/status/968526104964272128.
228. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 848–51.
229. Id. at 836.
230. Id. at 842–51. See also Michael Kagan, Jennings v. Rodriguez Might Not Be About Immigration
After All, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/jennings-v-rodriguezmight-not-be-about-immigration-after-all/.
231. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 848–51.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 836.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 852–59.
236. Id. at 852, 859. Justice Thomas argued that jurisdiction was precluded by INA §242(b)(9),
barring judicial review of any claims relating to removal other than through a petition for review from a
final removal order. Id.
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Justice Alito’s disposition of the merits of the case assuming jurisdiction.237 The
concurring opinion itself focused solely on the jurisdictional issues. Justice Gorsuch
joined Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion except as to a footnote expressing
agreement with Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Demore v. Kim on the
Court’s lack of jurisdiction over all issues of immigration detention.238
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor.239 Like the Ninth Circuit (albeit with slightly different reasoning), he
used constitutional avoidance to interpret the detention statutes as authorizing
bond hearings:
The relevant constitutional language, purposes, history, traditions,
context, and case law, taken together, make it likely that, where
confinement of the noncitizens before us is prolonged (presumptively
longer than six months), bail proceedings are constitutionally required.
Given this serious constitutional problem, I would interpret the
statutory provisions before us as authorizing bail. Their language
permits that reading, it furthers their basic purposes, and it is consistent
with the history, tradition, and constitutional values associated with
bail proceedings.240
Justice Breyer did not agree, however, with the additional procedural
requirements imposed by the district court and the Ninth Circuit.241 Instead, he
would have applied “customary rules of procedure and burdens of proof . . . .”242
iii. Reactions to Jennings
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez,
thousands of noncitizens each year must remain detained during the pendency of
their removal proceedings, many for a year or more, with no right to a bond
hearing.243 As Justice Breyer highlighted in his dissenting opinion, the conditions of
this detention are at best less than ideal, and, at worst, truly horrific.244 As a result

237. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 859.
238. Id. at 852, 857 n.6.
239. Id. at 859–76.
240. Id. at 876.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“identifying, in 2015, 7,500 asylum seekers
and 12,220 noncitizens who have finished serving sentences of criminal confinement, a portion of whom
are class members detained for more than six months”) (referencing Amici Curiae Brief 6, 8).
244. See id. at 861; see also, EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO ET AL., ACLU, JUSTICE-FREE ZONES: U.S. IMMIGRATION
DETENTION UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 30, 2020); Caitlin Dickerson et al., Immigrants Say They
Were
Pressured
into
Unneeded
Surgeries,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
29,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/29/us/ice-hysterectomies-surgeries-georgia.html.
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of COVID-19, immigration detention now presents an additional grave threat to
detainees’ health and even life. 245 This outcome is deeply horrifying on both an
individual and systemic level, and must not be minimized. It will cause
immeasurable harm to countless noncitizens.246
Jennings also does not appear to represent a particularly significant
change in the doctrine of the canon of constitutional avoidance. Justice Alito did
answer the questions of when and how the doctrine should be invoked more
narrowly in Jennings than did Justice Breyer for the Court in Zadvydas. The
substance of the doctrine, however, was not meaningfully altered. This swing away
from relying on constitutional avoidance likely represents more of a political,
outcome-driven shift, dependent on who has the majority on the court, than an
actual change in the law.247 Such a shift is part of a general trend on the court,
outside the immigration context, and has historical precedent.248
At the same time, the Jennings decision has the possibility of promoting
positive doctrinal developments at multiple levels in immigration law. First, the
Supreme Court has now squarely placed the question of the constitutionality of
prolonged pre-final removal order detention with no hearing before the Ninth

245. See Dennis Kuo et al., The Hidden Curve: Estimating the Spread of COVID-19 among People
in ICE Detention, VERA INST. OF JUST. (June 2020), https://www.vera.org/the-hidden-curve-covid-19-in-icedetention; see also Noelle Smart & Adam Garcia, Tracking COVID-19 in Immigration Detention: A
Dashboard of ICE Data, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.vera.org/tracking-covid-19-inimmigration-detention.
246. See, e.g., Sarah Paoletti, Jennings v. Rodriguez in an Era of Mass Incarceration of NonCitizens,
REGULATORY
REVIEW:
OPINION
(Jul.
23,
2018),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/07/23/paoletti-jennings-rodriguez-era-mass-incarceration-noncitizens/ (describing the increasingly common situation of a noncitizen who elected not to pursue a valid
claim for relief because they would have to remain in prolonged detention in order to do so).
247. Compare Justice Breyer’s decision for the Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682–702
(2001), with his dissenting opinion in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. at 859–76. But cf. Krishnakumar,
Passive, supra note 53, at 516–20. A number of scholars have written about the frequent and aggressive
use of the constitutional avoidance doctrine in the early years of Justice Roberts’ tenure as Chief Justice
and resulting criticism. Krishnakumar, Passive, supra note 53, at 516–20; Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas
P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109,
2111-12 (2015); Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 173, 173-74 (2014);
Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV.
181, 184 (2009). Professor Krishnakumar theorizes that the marked withdrawal of the Roberts Court
from this explicit invocation of constitutional avoidance is in part due to the prior criticism.
Krishnakumar, Passive, supra note 54, at 516–20.
248. Krishnakumar, supra note 54, at 562–68. A similar swing away from the use of the canon of
constitutional avoidance occurred in the Warren Court following the Court’s decision in Witkovich and
other “cases involving the rights of persons [involved in] subversive activities.” Krishnakumar, supra note
54, at 565–68. Cf. Kagan, supra note 230. (arguing that the Court’s decision in Jennings stems from
general principles of statutory interpretation rather than from anything particularly related to the
immigration context).
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Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has already suggested in Rodriguez III that this practice is
unconstitutional.249 A clear decision on this point could result in bond hearings and
release for thousands of noncitizen detainees each year. Whether the Ninth Circuit
will ultimately render a decision answering this question, however, remains
uncertain. The Ninth Circuit could choose instead to dismiss the case because class
certification is no longer appropriate, as Justice Alito suggested, 250 or for lack of
jurisdiction, as Justice Thomas suggested.251 Varying levels of optimism on the
question of whether the Ninth Circuit will ultimately reach the constitutional
questions were apparent following release of the Court’s decision. 252
Second, as previously discussed, the extensive use of the canon of
constitutional avoidance in immigration cases generally, and immigration detention
cases specifically, has led to incoherence and uncertainty in the case law. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings limiting its use could result in greater
protection of immigrants’ rights by pushing courts to decide constitutional issues
directly and to move away from “phantom constitutional norms.”253 Finally, as also
previously discussed, courts' invocation of the canon of constitutional avoidance
and the plenary power doctrine has the tendency to be mutually reinforcing. By
breaking this cycle, the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings may represent an
incremental step away from the dominance of the plenary power doctrine and
immigration exceptionalism in immigration law.254
Justice Alito’s decision for the Court creates a false dichotomy between this
immediate practical harm and potential for future doctrinal gain. While Justice Alito
asserts that the Ninth Circuit had not previously considered the constitutional
questions, this is not strictly true.255 As previously discussed in section II.B, the Ninth
Circuit in Rodriguez III considered and discussed these issues at length.256 Indeed,
the opinion suggests that the panel in Rodriguez III might have decided the case on
the basis of the constitutional arguments directly had they not considered
themselves bound by the panel’s invocation of constitutional avoidance in

249. See Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1074–78.
250. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851–52.
251. Id. at 852.
252. Compare Kevin Johnson, Argument Analysis: Justices Seem Primed to Find Constitutional
Limits on the Detention of Immigrants, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 4, 2017, 12:44 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/argument-analysis-justices-seem-primed-find-constitutionallimits-detention-immigrants/, with Garrett Epps, How the Supreme Court is Expanding the Immigrant
Detention
System
,
THE
ATLANTIC:
POLITICS
(Mar.
9,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/jennings-v-rodriguez/555224/.
253. See Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 15.
254. Cf. Kagan, supra note 230 (suggesting that the Court’s decision is more about statutory
interpretation than immigration law).
255.
See,
e.g.,
Anil
Kalhan
(@kalhan),
TWITTER
(Feb.
27,
2018),
https://twitter.com/kalhan/status/968523672309858304.
256. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1074–78.
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Rodriguez II.257 Furthermore, the constitutional issues were fully briefed and argued
before the Supreme Court.258 Jennings v. Rodriguez offered the Court the clear
opportunity to address the constitutionality of pre-final removal order immigration
detention, and to define the role of the Constitution and the plenary power
doctrine in modern immigration law. Following reargument in October 2017, the
Court was widely expected to do so.259
Instead, the Court chose to push this question off by remanding it to the Ninth
Circuit to decide in the first instance. To weigh the full impact of this choice on the
plenary power doctrine and immigration exceptionalism, we must look at the
ongoing litigation in Jennings itself as well as other post-Jennings decisions involving
pre-final removal order immigration detention issued by the lower federal courts
and the Supreme Court.
IV. POST-JENNINGS
Developments since the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings have been
decidedly mixed. On the one hand, the courts in Jennings themselves have yet to
offer the constitutional decision on the merits called for by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court themselves have continued to shy away from
constitutional avoidance and constitutional decisions on the merits in the context
of immigration detention. On the other hand, the Central District for California in
another case, and other federal district courts, have found arbitrary and prolonged
immigration detention to be unconstitutional in several different contexts.
Subsection III.A below will highlight the progress (or lack thereof) of
Jennings v. Rodriguez on remand before the Ninth Circuit and the Central District of
California. Section III.B will explore the Supreme Court’s decision in Nielsen v.
Preap.260 Section III.C will consider two district court cases, Fraihat v. U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,261 and Lukaj v. McAleenan,262 as examples
of post-Jennings decisions in cases challenging immigration detention that directly

257. Id. at 1080–81.
258. See Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No.
15-1204), (2017 WL 430387); Supplemental Brief for the Respondents, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.
830 (2018) (No. 15-1204), (2016 WL 6123731); Supplemental Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204), (2017 WL 727754); Respondents’ Supplemental Reply
Brief, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204), (2017 WL 695458); Transcript of Oral
Argument, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204), (Argument on October 3, 2017).
259. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 252 (“Ultimately, this case offers the Supreme Court the
opportunity to address the modern vitality of the plenary-power doctrine and finally decide whether,
and if so how, the Constitution applies to arriving aliens.”).
260. Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019).
261. Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 20, 2020); Fraihat
v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. EDCV 19–1546 JGB (SHKx) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210929 (C.D. Ca.
Oct. 7, 2020).
262. Lukaj v. McAleenan, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2019).
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confront the constitutionality of arbitrary and prolonged pre-final removal order
detention. Section III.D will examine what conclusions can be drawn today, three
years after the Supreme Court’s much anticipated decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez.
A. Jennings v. Rodriguez: After the Supreme Court
As of February 2021, three years after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Jennings v. Rodriguez, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Central District of California
have issued a decision on the constitutionality of prolonged pre-final removal order
detention without a hearing. In November 2018, following the Supreme Court’s
decision, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the Central District of California
for the district court to rule in the first instance on the questions of class
certification and constitutionality raised by the Supreme Court, as well as any other
issue the district court found relevant.263 In the remand order, the Ninth Circuit
again strongly telegraphed its belief that the statutory provisions at stake, if
interpreted to allow for prolonged detention without hearing, are
unconstitutional.264 The Ninth Circuit explicitly left the permanent injunction in
place in its remand, stating “[w]e have grave doubts that any statute that allows for
arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those
who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government's
arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.”265 They specifically
instructed the district court to determine “the minimum requirements of due
process for each subclass.”266
Proceedings before the district court have continued since the Ninth
Circuit’s remand, although they were stayed for several months during the COVID19 pandemic.267 The district court denied the government’s motion to decertify the
class,268 and the government’s appeal on this issue remains pending before the
Ninth Circuit.269 Discovery is currently ongoing before the district court, and
plaintiffs have a deadline for their motion for summary judgment in June 2021. 270
Given the pace of the litigation, it seems likely to still be years before the Ninth

263. Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255–56 (9th Cir. 2018).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 256.
266. Id. at 255.
267. See Order Granting Joint Stipulation to Temporarily Suspend Case Schedule, Rodriguez v.
Marin, No. 07-CV-03239 (C.D. Ca. May 19, 2020), ECF No. 554; Order Granting Joint Stipulation to
Temporarily Suspend Case Schedule, Rodriguez v. Marin, No. 07-CV-03239 (C.D. Ca. June 18, 2020), ECF
No. 557.
268. Order Denying Motion to Decertify Class, Rodriguez v. Marin, No. 07-CV-03239 (C.D. Ca. May
28, 2020), ECF No. 555.
269. Rodriguez v. Barr, No. 20-55770, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 33716 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2020).
270. Order Granting Joint Stipulation for Scheduling Order, Rodriguez v. Marin, No. 07-CV-03239
(C.D. Ca. Sept. 18, 2020), ECF No. 562.
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Circuit has the opportunity to speak again on the constitutionality of arbitrary and
prolonged pre-final removal order immigration detention, and the case may once
more end up before the Supreme Court. Any optimism, then, that the Supreme
Court’s decision would result in quick and clear resolution of the constitutional
question was misplaced.
B. Nielsen v. Preap
During the time that Jennings v. Rodriguez has remained pending on
remand before the Ninth Circuit and the Central District of California, the Supreme
Court heard a case involving another aspect of INA § 236(c); one of the pre-final
removal order detention provisions at issue in Jennings. Nielsen v. Preap presented
a narrow question: whether an individual with a criminal conviction that would
otherwise be included within the statute’s detention mandate was still subject to
mandatory detention if not taken into immigration custody immediately “when
released” from criminal custody.271 On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court issued
its decision answering this question with a definitive “yes.”272
As in Jennings, the Court had difficulty reaching consensus. Justice Alito
again wrote the opinion for the Court, joined in full by Justices Roberts and
Kavanaugh and in part by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. 273 Justice Alito once more
focused primarily on statutory interpretation to resolve the case, here holding, inter
alia, that the rules of English grammar led to the conclusion that mandatory
detention under INA section 236(c) applies to otherwise included noncitizens who
are taken into custody by immigration some time after being released from criminal
custody.274 He rejected the use of constitutional avoidance on similar grounds to
Jennings, finding the statute unambiguous and therefore not subject to different
plausible interpretations.275 A direct constitutional challenge had not been raised
and was therefore not before the court.276
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize the
narrowness of the issues presented in the case. 277 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch
again would have found no jurisdiction, but joined the sections of Justice Alito’s
decision not dealing with jurisdiction.278 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan dissented and would have used the statute’s plain language and structure as
well as applicable canons of statutory interpretation, including the canon of
constitutional avoidance, to reach the contrary conclusion.279

271. Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 958–72.
274. Id. at 964–65.
275. Id. at 971–72.
276. Id. at 972.
277. Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 972–73.
278. Id. at 973–76.
279. Id. at 976–85.

2021

IMMIGRATION DETENTION: EROSION OR
REINFORCEMENT OF A THEORY OF IMMIGRATION
EXCEPTIONALISM

755

Again, the Court’s decision did not invoke plenary power or immigration
exceptionalism. Some commentators, however, see the case as promoting
immigration exceptionalism: “In Preap, the Court reaffirmed a jurisprudence that
increasingly defies the prevailing norms of due process and judicial deference to
agency interpretations. While immigration law’s norm-defying character is well
established, Preap confirms that immigration detention is perhaps the most
exceptional area of one of American law’s most exceptional domains.”280 Others
see the Court as exercising restraint and inching away from immigration
exceptionalism.281
A majority of the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction,
thereby refusing to give the executive “carte blanche over immigration.” 282 The
result is damaging to noncitizens, meaning that a significant number of individuals
will be subject to arbitrary and prolonged detention while their removal
proceedings are pending. Had the Court held that it had no jurisdiction, however,
leaving it up to the Executive to interpret the statute and impose immigration
detention as he saw fit, it could have been far worse.
C. District Court Cases
District Courts throughout the country have also continued to grapple with
petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by noncitizens subject to immigration
detention under INA sections 235 and 236.283 Unlike the Central District of
California in Jennings v. Rodriguez, a number of district courts (including the Central
District in other cases) have ruled directly on the constitutionality of prolonged
detention under these statutes after the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings. 284
This section will discuss two of these cases as examples of this trend: Lukaj v.
McAleenan285 and Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.286

280. The Supreme Court - Leading Cases: Nielsen v. Preap, 133 HARV. L.R. 392, 401 (2019).
281. Cecillia Wang, Symposium: Supreme Court Not Ready to Give President Carte Blanche Over
Immigration, SCOTUSBLOG (July 25, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/symposiumsupreme-court-not-ready-to-give-president-carte-blanche-over-immigration/.
282. Id.
283. See TRAC Immigr., Suits Challenging the Confinement of Noncitizens Up (2018), at
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/528/.
284. District courts prior to the Supreme Court also reached this conclusion. See, e.g., ACLU,
PRACTICE ADVISORY: PROLONGED DETENTION CHALLENGES AFTER JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2018_03_21_jennings_v_rodriguez_practice
_advisory.pdf(listing cases).
285. Lukaj v. McAleenan, 420 F.Supp.3d 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2019).
286. Fraihat v. United States Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20,
2020); Fraihat v. United States Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, EDCV 19-1546 JGB (SHKx), 2020 WL 6541994,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020).
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i. Lukaj v. McAleenan
Lukaj v. McAleenan was decided by the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida in October 2019.287 Alban Lukaj was an Albanian citizen
who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States after entering as a
refugee but was placed into removal proceedings as the result of criminal
convictions.288 Mr. Lukaj was detained during the pendency of his removal
proceedings without opportunity for bond pursuant to INA § 236(c).289 After
extensive discussion, the court held that Mr. Lukaj’s prolonged detention violated
his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment but did not violate his rights
under the Eight Amendment. 290
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Middle
District was bound by the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Sopo v. U.S. Attorney General.291 The Eleventh Circuit in Sopo, similar to the Ninth
Circuit in Jennings, interpreted INA § 236(c) to authorize mandatory detention
without a bond hearing only for a reasonable amount of time in order to avoid the
serious constitutional issues that would otherwise result.292 With this option no
longer available post-Jennings, the Middle District in Lukaj chose to answer the
Supreme Court’s call to address the constitutional question directly. 293
The court began its discussion of the law with a detailed and unequivocal
statement that the protections of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
applied to detention during deportation proceedings.294 It distinguished Mr. Lukaj’s
situation from Demore due to the length of his detention295 and went on to consider
whether Mr. Lukaj’s continued detention was reasonable in light of a list of factors
very similar to those considered by the court in Sopo including the length and
characteristics of his detention and the status of his removal proceedings.296
Ultimately, the Court found that “Lukaj's year-long detention in a criminal facility
where he has not received treatment for his medical condition and with what
amounts to a restart of his entire removal proceedings constitutes an unreasonably
prolonged detention in violation of the Due Process Clause that entitles him to an
individualized bond hearing.”297
This decision in Lukaj was ultimately vacated because, by the time of the
district court’s decision, Mr. Lukaj was detained pursuant to INA § 241(a), post-final

287. Lukaj v. McAleenan, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1265 (2019).
288. Id. at 1267–68.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1276–77.
291. Id. at 1270–71; Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016).
292. Sopo, 825 F.3d at 1199.
293. Lukaj, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1271.
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297. Id. at 1276.

2021

IMMIGRATION DETENTION: EROSION OR
REINFORCEMENT OF A THEORY OF IMMIGRATION
EXCEPTIONALISM

757

removal order detention, not INA § 236(c), pre-final removal order mandatory
detention.298 The district court’s initial decision in Lukaj, however, remains a
valuable illustration of the impact of Jennings on the lower federal courts. It further
serves as an example of a continued inching away from immigration exceptionalism
rather than an outright rejection of the premise. As a result of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Jennings, the court did move from recognizing a “phantom”
constitutional norm to recognizing a true constitutional norm. It did so, however,
by considering almost exclusively cases decided in the immigration context,
implicitly reinforcing a continued conclusion that immigration is somehow
different.
ii. Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Unlike most of the cases discussed thus far, Fraihat does not concern
detention under or the interpretation of one of the immigration detention statutes.
Instead, Fraihat is a class action lawsuit alleging that the conditions under which ICE
detainees are held during the COVID-19 pandemic violate the U.S. Constitution.299
Plaintiffs raise several claims under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
including medical indifference and punitive conditions of confinement during the
COVID-19 pandemic and one claim that individuals with disabilities were denied the
benefits of executive agency programs in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. 300 The
District Court for the Central District of California certified two subclasses—
individuals with (1) a risk factor or (2) a disability that causes heightened risk of
severe illness from COVID-19—and issued a preliminary injunction on April 20,
2020.301 The court held that plaintiffs “are likely to succeed on the merits of one or
more of their claims, will suffer irreparable harm as a result of the deprivation of
their rights, and that the balance of equities and public interest heavily weigh in
favor of granting preliminary relief.” 302 On October 7, 2020, the district court issued
an order compelling compliance with the preliminary injunction.303
Fraihat can be seen as a more significant step away from immigration
exceptionalism than Lukaj and other similar cases. In Fraihat, the court again
recognized that ICE detainees are protected by the U.S. Constitution, including the
due process clause. It did so in this instance, however, by applying mainstream
cases in the immigration context instead of by continuing to treat immigration as
different.

298. Lukaj v. McAleenan, 3:19-cv-241-J-34MCR, 2020 WL 248724, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2020).
299. Fraihat, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 718.
300. Id. at 719.
301. Id.
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D. Conclusions
In 1990, Professor Motomura wrote: “[W]hat is left of the plenary power
doctrine? A widely accepted view, with which I generally agree, is that the doctrine
is in some state of decline.”304 In 2019, Professor Johnson wrote: “The Supreme
Court's recent immigration decisions unquestionably reflect the continuation of the
move of immigration law toward the legal mainstream and away from ‘immigration
exceptionalism.’”305 Almost thirty years separate these two quotes, but Professor
Motomura’s quote could have been written today. While progress away from the
plenary power doctrine and immigration exceptionalism has been made, courts,
advocates, and scholars continue to operate within their framework. As the cases
discussed in this section show, change has been slower, more subtle, and more
uneven than predicted or desired.
Calls for the Supreme Court to explicitly denounce the plenary power doctrine
began as early as the 1980s and continue today.306 While immigration scholars and
advocates continue to hope that the Supreme Court will confront the plenary
power doctrine head on, it is far more likely that the doctrine will continue along its
slow and non-linear path of erosion.
V. CONCLUSION
For at least the last four years, noncitizens have had to rely heavily on the
federal courts to protect the rights of ICE detainees. The ability of the courts to act,
however, has continued to be constrained by the plenary power doctrine and a
theory of immigration exceptionalism. While the courts have made some progress
away from the limitations of this framework, they have fallen far short of
repudiating the concepts that immigration law is different and that the executive
may operate unconstrained by the normal principles of law. While the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez could be seen as calling for greater clarity
and more radical change on this topic, the aftermath of Jennings, including the
ongoing litigation in the Jennings case itself, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nielsen
v. Preap, and the decisions of the lower federal courts in cases challenging the
detention of noncitizens, have shown us that any change will continue to occur at
a snail’s pace, with almost as much progress backwards as forwards.
As a country, we stand on a precipice of potential for fundamental change.
The Biden Administration should recognize the inability and/or unwillingness of the
federal courts to move quickly and to adequately protect noncitizen detainees. The
Executive Branch has the authority to act rapidly and decisively to end or

304. Motomura, supra note 15, at 549.
305. Johnson, supra note 16, at 473.
306. Compare Motomura, supra note 15, at 547 (“Jean could have been the occasion for the Court
to confront squarely the ‘plenary power doctrine.’”) with Johnson, supra note 213 (“Ultimately, this case
offers the Supreme Court the opportunity to address the modern vitality of the plenary-power doctrine
and finally decide whether, and if so how, the Constitution applies to arriving aliens.”).

2021

IMMIGRATION DETENTION: EROSION OR
REINFORCEMENT OF A THEORY OF IMMIGRATION
EXCEPTIONALISM

759

substantially limit the civil detention of noncitizens on a systemic and an individual
level.307 As Professor Das argues, “federal agencies can and should play a larger role
in enforcing constitutional norms in immigration law.” 308 At the systemic level, the
Biden Administration should end immigration detention or, at a minimum, stop
detaining noncitizens in private prisons. If immigration detention is not completely
abolished, at an individual level, the Biden Administration should create a culture
within the Department of Homeland Security that respects immigrants and favors
the release of ICE detainees in all but the most extreme circumstances. 309

307. See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 836–38 (2018); Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet,
Presidential Ideology and Immigration Detention, 69 DUKE L.J. 1855 (May 2020).
308. Das, supra note 13.
309. Cf. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, Presidential Ideology and Immigration Detention, 69 DUKE
L.J. 1855 (May 2020) (analyzing custody decisions over the last twenty years and showing that
noncitizens fared worse in custody determinations under the Trump administration).

